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On Contractual
Defaultsand Experimental
Law
andEconomics
Comment
by
Avishalom Tor*
economicsspecifically
Experimental
methodologies
generallyand experimental
havetheadvantageof providing
controlled
testsof hypotheses
thereregarding
of
variables
relevance
and
Talley
[2005],
(Camerer
among
lationship
legal
Tor [2007]).In fact,experimental
law andeconomics("ELE") - whichuses the
of experimental
economics- has alreadymadesignificant
contribumethodology
tionsto legalscholarship.
The application
ofanymethodology
without
awareness
of its inherent
its validity,
and ELE is
limitations,
however,
maywell diminish
no exception.
Thiscomment
on Sloof, Oosterbeek, and Sonnemans' [2007]
andclearexperiment1
willemphasize
bothELE's potential
and
("SOS") interesting
itslimitations.
SOS examinedtheimpactof contractual
defaults
in a bilateralgame,withfull
forperformance.
information
and monetary
incentives
werepaired,
Participants
a contract
ofhis choice- eitherthedefaultor one of
one ("Proposer")
proposing
- andtheother("Respondent")
threeothercontracts
toacceptthe
decidingwhether
contract
wasproposed,
as wellas whenever
proposal.Whenthedefault
Respondent
contract
neither
applied.SOS foundparticipants
rejectedtheproposal,thedefault
morelikelytoproposenormorelikelyto acceptthedefault
to
contract,
compared
thealternative
contracts.
concludedthatdefaultremedies
had little
Theytherefore
tono effect
choiceofcontract
onparticipants'
("theNo Bias Finding").
TheNo Bias Findingfitstherational
choiceprediction
thatcontract
default
rules
willnotbe "sticky."
on thechoicesofcontracting
Suchrulesshouldhaveno effect
- whowillrelyonefficient
andcontract
defaults
aroundinefficient
ones- in
parties
After
theabsenceof transaction
or
information
costs,externalities,
asymmetries.2
* Theideas
herehavebenefited
fromdiscussions
withEhudGuttel,
Jefpresented
andAnnevanAaken.Myworkonthiscomment
hasenjoyed
thehosRachlinski,
frey
forLaw,Economics,
andsupport
oftheOlinCenter
andBusinessat Harvard
pitality
Law School.
1 Given
thiscomment
discusses
SOS
onlysomeoftheintriguing
spaceconstraints,
results.
A typical
recent
statement
ofthistraditional
lawandeconomics
viewis Posner
[2003,p. 98].
Journal
ofInstitutional
andTheoretical
Economics
JITE163(2007),26-29©2007MohrSiebeck- ISSN 0932-4569
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forthelatter
SOS werenotexpected
toobservedefault
contract
variables,
controlling
stickiness.
Atthesametime,however,
theNo Bias Findingseemstocontradict
an
extensive
thatdefaultrulesmaywell be
bodyof empiricalevidencesuggesting
ofrational
choicemodels.
sticky
beyondthepredictions
In one of onlytwoearlierspecificexperimental
testsof contractual
defaults,
weretold
Korobkin[1998]usedthreecontract
scenarios.
negotiation
Participants
a company
andresponded
forthe
tomeasuresoftheirpreference
theyrepresented
contract
termatstake.Theresults
showeda consistent
biasinfavorofthe
particular
statusquo default
term;labelinga giventermthedefault
significantly
strengthened
forthatterm.Theseresultsareinaccordwithan extensive
participants'
preference
ontheimpactofdefaults,
thestatusquo,andreference
literature
points
experimental
moregenerally
onpreferences
(e.g.,Kahneman,Knetsch, and Thaler [1990];
Kahneman and Tversky [1979]; Samuelson and Zeckhauser [1988];but
see Plott and Zeiler [2005]),3whichis further
corroborated
bya diversebody
offieldevidence(Camerer [2000]).4
Itis possiblethatcontract
default
is contingent
rules,whoserelevance
uponparties'agreement
tocontract,
differ
fromotherdefault
states.Partiestherefore
might
notperceive
contractual
defaults
as relevant
reference
contingent
points(Korobkin
theSOS "default
contract"
however,
[1998];Schwab [1988]).Ironically,
applied
whenever
and
whenever
a non-default
inevitably
rejected
proposed
Respondents
resemblance
to a legalright
thanto a contractual
default.
proposal,
bearinggreater
oftypical
contractual
defaults
cannotaccountfortheNo Bias
Thus,thecontingency
Finding.
OtheraspectsoftheSOS experimental
design,ontheotherhand,mayexplainthe
No Bias Finding.
theSOS participants
choseamongmonetary
gambles
Specifically,
withthedefaults
underrisk(withnouncertainty),
comprising
explicit
risky
gambles
as wellandproviding
nofixedreference
alsofacedonlyexpected
points.Participants
thegambleswerecolor-coded
totalgains.And,finally,
devoidofthe
"contracts,"
and legal context
thatdefinea real-world
or
contract,
veryinstitutional
remedy,
default
rule.
Thesecharacteristics
a laudableadherence
to experimental
ecolargelyreflect
nomicsconventions,
the
of
incentives
for
including provision monetary
performof behaviorrather
thanverbalresponses;andtheabstract
ance;themeasurement
of experimental
(Camerer and Talley [2005]). The same
description
settings
a contextin whichtheveryphealso
characteristics,
however, generated
design
3 Additional
related
includeomission
anddecisionavoidbias,regret
phenomena
andmore.
ance,inertia
4 Thereis also
anecdotal
evidence
ofparties'
reluctance
tocontract
around
specific
thatappearslargelyinexplicable
froma rationalchoiceperspective.
legaldefaults
Donohue [1991]notedthatlitigants
do notcontract
around
thelegalruleconcerning
of litigation
theallocation
Farnsworth[1999]examcosts,evenwherebeneficial.
ineda random
setof20 nuisance
casesafter
nobargaining;
theparjudgment,
finding
ties'lawyers
alsodidnotbelievethere
wouldhavebeenbargaining
iftheresults
were
reversed.
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to manifest
itself:Neitherendowment
nomenonSOS soughtto testwas unlikely
norlossaversion
occurformoney(Kahneman,Knetsch, and Thaler
typically
of thetradeoff
aboutthebenefits
[1990]); loss aversionalso requiresuncertainty
states(Novemskyand Kahneman [2005]);5thosereference
betweenalternative
aretypically
certain
lossaversion
ora statusquobias,moreover,
pointsthatgenerate
thancomprising
(orat leastappearso todecisionmakers)rather
explicitmonetary
to appearin choicesamong
loss aversionwouldbe unlikely
gambles;and,finally,
potential
gains.
as a reference
An adoptionof thedefaultcontract
point- and theresulting
- stillmighthavebeen
loss
on
the
of
of a potential
part participants
perception
thatof
orlegalcontext,
morerealistic,
institutional
achievedina richer,
resembling
avoided.Giventhetotality
was intentionally
Korobkin [1998],butsucha context
to
resultsshowingthedefaultcontract
oftheSOS experimental
design,therefore,
No
Bias
indeed.
The
would
have
been
dramatic
choices
present
impactparticipants'
of thebroaderbehavioral
Finding,on theotherhand,accordswiththefindings
choiceprediction
alike.
literature
andtherational
to
of experimental
economicscan contribute
The methodological
conventions
in
for
the
use
behavior
When
markets,
instance,
studying
repetitive
legalanalysis.
willoften
incentives
trialsandtheprovision
ofmonetary
ofmultiple
performance
one
must
take
care
notto
Whenstudying
be appropriate.6
however,
behavior,
legal
thatshapeanddefinethisbehavior
abstract
fromthoseaspectsofthelegalcontext
wouldnotlimit
intherealworld(see Rachlinski [2000]).Sucha careful
approach
toolforlegalanalysis.
andeffective
makeita morevalid,versatile,
ELE, butrather
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